Ninety percent of the chief executive officers in A m e r i c a n c o r p o r a t i o n s believe that the liability problems of directors a n d officers are d a m a g i n g the quality of corporate governance, according to a survey released in 1987 by Peat Marwick. T h e survey of almost eight thousand chief executives in b o t h the corporate a n d nonprofit sectors is believed to be the most comprehensive liability survey ever conducted. A p p r o x i m a t e l y one third of the executives overall a n d one half of those from smaller corp o r a
t i o n s c o n c l u d e d that the liability p r o b l e m h a d already reached a crisis stage, a n d one fourth of the executives reported that their directors h a d been involved in l i t i g a t i o n r e l a t i n g to director l i a b i l i t y ( " D & O L i a b i l i t y , " 1987).
T h e concern over liability illustrated by this survey has led the owners of family businesses to question the role of the board of directors. W h a t is the general legal function of the board? H o w m i g h t this function be different in a family-owned corporation? H o w does the board's legal function translate into liability? H o w can directors prevent liability or at least protect themselves from the consequences of liability? T h i s article addresses these questions.
In most states, general corporation law is based on a model act developed by the American B a r Association. T h e latest version of this act is the Revised Model Business C o r p o r a t i o n Act of 1984 (Revised Model. . . , 1985). W h i l e the general principles of corporation law apply to all types of corporations, several states have adopted specific provisions for family a n d other close corporations. T h e Model Statutory Close C o r p o r a t i o n Note: T h e authors wish to thank Philip M. Dawson, a partner in the law firm of Calfee, Halter & Griswold, Cleveland; Brian Sullivan, a partner in the law firm of Dykema, Gossett, Spencer, Goodnow & Trigg, Detroit; and Joel D. Tauber, president of Key International Manufacturing, Inc., Southfield, Michigan, for their helpful comments.
T h e Board's Legal Function
In the classic corporate model, the directors have ultimate m a n a g e m e n t responsibility. According to Section 8.01 of the Model Act, "all corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business a n d affairs of the corporation m a n a g e d under the direction of, its board of directors." In practice, boards can delegate powers to board c o m m i ttees, subject to exceptions, such as a m e n d i n g articles of i n c o r p o r a t i o n and bylaws. T h e board can also delegate to officers the authority to implement board policies.
T h e classic model frequently breaks down in the family corporation setting for two reasons. First, even when the corporation has adopted the classic legal structure, the structure is often ignored in practice because the founder of the firm, sometimes aided by other family members, makes all decisions. Under these circumstances, boards are little more than paper or rubber-stamp boards (Dyer, 1986) .
Second, the family corporation may choose to adopt a nontraditional legal structure. T h e Close Corporation Supplement provides that a family corporation can operate w i t h o u t a board of directors, in w h i c h case the responsibilities and liabilities that normally fall o n directors are placed instead o n the voting shareholders.
Furthermore, even if the corporation has a board of directors, the shareholders can agree to transfer m a n a g e m e n t responsibilities from the directors to the shareholders. T h e effect of such an agreement is that the business can be operated as if it were a partnership.
W h e n a family corporation decides to sterilize the board of directors through a shareholder agreement or to eliminate the board completely, the creation of an advisory board is often recommended. T h i s board counsels owners o n matters handled by a traditional board of directors, such as corporate policy, long-range planning, capital expenditures, and employee c o m p e n s a t i o n . B u t , perhaps m o r e important, the advisory board plays a critical role in succession p l a n n i n g . D a n c o does n o t overstate the case w h e n he notes (1982, p. 137 ) that "the single most important j o b of the board of directors in the family corporation should be . . . to provide for the profitable continuity of the firm. It must promote proper m a n a g e m e n t development to allow for the 'passing of the torch' from the founder generation to the successor generation." W h i l e n o legal requirements govern selection of the advisory board, c o m m o n sense dictates that the board should include members with professional legal or a c c o u n t i n g experience and business experience. Advisory board members should also c o m e from outside the company. A n attorney or accountant retained as a professional by the c o m p a n y m i g h t be less w i l l i n g to provide a critical assessment than an outside professional. W h i l e the outsider does not provide the firm with actual services, he or she can offer an independent second o p i n i o n that is not available w h e n the accountant or attorney is both retained by the firm and serves o n the advisory board.
Directors' Liability
Directors' liability is generally based on the director's duty of care a n d fiduciary duty. In the family corporation, two other theories of liability are also important: piercing the corporate veil and liability for personal actions. In this section, we discuss these four types of liability.
Duty of Care. Directors are required by statute to exercise due care. I n the words of Section 8.30 of the Model Act (Revised Model. . . , 1985) a director must act "with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like p o s i t i o n w o u l d exercise under similar circumstances." State corporation laws also list specific types of liability from w h i c h the exercise of ordinary care is n o protection. For example, these laws h o l d directors personally responsible for distribution of an illegal dividend, losses resulting from activities beyond its lawful powers, and contracts made in states where the corporation has not obtained a certificate of authority to conduct business.
T w o factors mitigate the duty of care. First, directors are entitled to rely o n reports, o p i n i o n s , financial data, and other information supplied by c o m p a n y employees, professionals (legal counsel, accountants), or board committees-provided that directors have n o reason to be suspicious of this information.
Second, and perhaps more important, courts have adopted a handsoff p h i l o s o p h y k n o w n as the business judgment rule when reviewing directors' decisions. In the words of the Delaware Supreme Court, the business j u d g m e n t rule "is a presumption that in m a k i n g a business decision the directors of a corporation acted o n an informed basis, in g o o d faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the c o m p a n y " (Aronson v. Lewis, 1984) . T h i s means that the party w h o challenges a business decision faces a difficult burden of proof. As a result, absent fraud or self-dealing, directors are rarely found liable for errors, mistakes, or simple bad j u d g m e n t (Block, Barton, and R a d i n , 1987).
I n addition to these legal factors, there are practical considerations that protect directors of a family corporation from liability. W h i l e it has Schipani, Siedel been asserted that a lawsuit filed by shareholders is the most serious risk that corporate executives face (Bishop, 1982) , in m a n y family corporations all shareholders serve o n the board. In cases where these shareh o l d e r -b o a r d m e m b e r s u n a n i m o u s l y agree o n a p a r t i c u l a r course of a c t i o n , there are n o shareholders left w h o can later assert that the board failed to exercise due care. Similarly, a l t h o u g h actions seeking recovery from directors charged with violating securities law may be the fastestg r o w i n g area of personal liability (Bishop, 1982) , most family corporations do not have or seek public financing. T h u s , the exposure of their directors under securities law is reduced.
T h i s is not to say, however, the a director may ignore the business affairs of the corporation without risk of personal liability. T h e r e is case authority for h o l d i n g a director personally liable for losses suffered by the corporation when those losses have been caused by the director's failure to discharge the duty of care. F o r instance, in Francis v. United Jersey Bank (1981) , the S u p r e m e Court of New Jersey held a director personally liable for the losses occasioned by the fraudulent acts of others. T h e director knew n o t h i n g about the corporation's affairs and had not even read financial statements that allegedly disclosed o n their face the m i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n of trust funds.
Fiduciary Duty. Directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation. As a result, contracts between a director and the corporation should be fair to the corporation, and a director should never personally enter into a business transaction in w h i c h the corporation m i g h t be interested.
Directors also owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders. In o n e case, a son w h o was the majority shareholder in a l u m b e r c o m p a n y operated the c o m p a n y after the death of his father. W h i l e in the process of n e g o t i a t i n g a sale of the c o m p a n y to Boise Cascade, he purchased shares held by his sister a n d brother without disclosing the p e n d i n g sale to them. A court later held h i m liable for damages o n the grounds that " a director has a fiduciary responsibility to b o t h the corporation and to shareholders" (Weatherby v. Weatherby Lumber Co., 1972).
Piercing
the Corporate Veil. T h e c o r p o r a t i o n represents a veil designed to protect its owners from personal liability. In the words of attorney Gilbert (a partner in Gilbert and Sullivan) in Utopia, Ltd.:
T h o u g h a R o t h s c h i l d you may be in your o w n capacity, As a c o m p a n y you've c o m e to utter sorrow-B u t the liquidators say, "Never mind, you needn't pay," S o you start another c o m p a n y tomorrow.
However, in family businesses there is a risk that courts will pierce the corporate veil and h o l d family members w h o serve as directors, shareholders, or employees personally liable if they have failed to treat the corporation as a separate entity. T h i s is especially true when the corporation has a paper or rubber-stamp board.
As a result, close attention should be paid to legal formalities. Courts are especially i n c l i n e d to pierce the corporate veil w h e n directors do n o t meet o n a regular basis, a n n u a l reports are n o t filed with the state, the corporation is undercapitalized, corporate assets are c o m m i n g l e d with personal assets, and corporate funds are used for personal purposes.
Personal Actions. Even when the corporate veil is preserved, individuals are liable for their own actions when n a m e d as defendants in a civil lawsuit. T h i s is a special concern in family corporations, where family members are active o n several fronts as directors, officers, a n d employees. If, for e x a m p l e , a family m e m b e r serving in these roles causes an autom o b i l e accident while o n c o m p a n y business, there is personal liability; the corporate veil provides n o protection, a l t h o u g h the corporation itself m i g h t also be liable.
Individuals also face potential c r i m i n a l liability for their o w n actions. I n recent years, for instance, local prosecuting attorneys have perceived a decline in federal safety inspections of businesses and as a result have become more aggressive in filing c r i m i n a l charges. I n one well-publicized case, a c o m p a n y president, plant manager, a n d foreman were sentenced to twenty years in prison after a worker died as a result of unsafe w o r k i n g conditions at their c o m p a n y ' s plant (Tasini, 1986 ).
Liability Prevention
It is possible to m i n i m i z e director liability o n b o t h a structural and a personal level. O n a structural level, the corporation should agree to indemnify directors for expenses resulting from litigation. However, the corporation's ability to indemnify is frequently limited by law (for e x a mple, in cases where the corporation itself is suing a director) a n d by the c o r p o r a t i o n ' s financial ability to pay. Consequently, an indemnification agreement should be complemented by liability insurance. In a family business where the board has been e l i m i n a t e d or where the power of a board has been diluted by a shareholder agreement, the shareholders are the ones w h o need to be protected by i n d e m n i t y a n d i n s u r a n c e arrangements.
L i a b i l i t y insurance has been p r o b l e m a t i c in recent years because it has b e c o m e very expensive or even unavailable. As a result, Delaware and several other states have enacted legislation a l l o w i n g corporations to e l i m i n a t e the personal liability o f outside directors to the corporation or its shareholders for failing to exercise due care.
T h e use of a board of advisers has been recommended as an alternative to the board of directors as a way o f preventing directors' liability. W h i l e courts have not yet determined the extent to w h i c h an advisory board m e m b e r may be held liable, this r e c o m m e n d a t i o n is highly suspect for two reasons. First, if the advisory board does in fact perform the functions of the board of directors, then it is possible that the advisers will be held just as liable as they w o u l d if they were directors. In other words, courts will probably place m o r e emphasis on the substance of the arrangement than o n the n a m e that it assumes.
Second, if the board is indeed only advisory, the members are in effect a c t i n g as consultants. A l t h o u g h they may avoid the liability imposed o n directors by statute, they still face liability if they give bad advice. F o r e x a m p l e , o n e executive w h o lost his outside directors was advised not to stay in touch with them. H i s lawyers concluded that the former directors c o u l d be held liable merely for providing advice ( B l u m e n t h a l , 1986). T h e risk of liability is c o m p o u n d e d by the fact that the usual m e c h a n i s m s designed to protect directors-such as the business j u d g m e n t rule, indemnification, a n d charter provisions l i m i t i n g personal liability-may be unavailable to advisory board members w h o are a c t i n g as consultants. And, even w h e n advisory board members are not held liable, the cost of l i t i g a t i o n can be substantial.
Beyond these structural approaches, directors should be able to avoid liability o n a personal level by a c t i n g in accordance with the two broad rules of t h u m b implicit in the business j u d g m e n t rule and in the concept of fiduciary duty: First, all decisions should be made o n an informed basis, with documentation sufficient to withstand a challenge in court. Second, the interests of the corporation should always c o m e before personal interests.
T o these general guidelines should be added o n e piece of procedural advice: A director w h o concludes that the board is m a k i n g an imprudent or illegal decision should dissent and make certain that the negative vote is recorded. Otherwise, silence will be construed as consent to the action, and this in turn can lead to liability.
Conclusion
M o r e than twenty-five years ago, L o r d B o o t h b y described the duties of a director ("Soft B o a r d s , " 1962, p. 96) as follows: " N o effort of any k i n d is called for . . . You go to a m e e t i n g once a m o n t h in a car supplied by the company. You l o o k b o t h grave and sage, a n d on two occasions say 'I agree,' say 'I don't think so' once, and if all goes well, you get $1,440 a year. If you have five of them, it is total heaven, like h a v i n g a permanent h o t b a t h . "
T i m e s have changed. Over the past two decades, increased concern over liability has led directors to become m u c h more involved in c o mp a n y operations. W h i l e this trend is positive, it has c o m e at a steep price in terms of personal liability. However, the price can be reduced or even avoided if certain measures are taken. T h e benefits of these measures over the l o n g run go far beyond keeping the director out of court. An active, informed board c o m p o s e d of members w h o place c o m p a n y interests before self-interests is the key to developing a sound organization that will benefit succeeding generations.
